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The paper reviews evidence that suggests that, over the coming two decades, people are likely 
to stay in the work force at least five years longer, possibly by considerably more. The 
implications for policy are surprisingly large and surprisingly unrecognized.  
Recent trends, if extended into the future, suggest that changes of this magnitude are quite 
likely given a continuation of past labour market conditions. However, these past trends do not 
reflect new pressures that will work strongly in the direction of even shorter durations of 
retirement and longer durations of work.  
These new pressures will result from changes in labour supply and demand that will result from 
the baby boom generation moving into traditional retirement years in large numbers, increasing 
the demand for older workers. On the supply side, there will be a large in increase in the 
educational levels and skills of older people. The effect of market forces could be further 
enhanced by policy action.  
In other words, a five year extension of working life is the minimum that should be included in 
most future labour market scenarios. Delaying work-retirement transitions by even this amount 
would have large, positive economic and fiscal effects, significantly reducing the well-known 
negative effects of population ageing. They would have particularly important consequences for 
pension policy, with a dramatic reduction in the need for retirement savings and, particularly if 
accompanied by flexible work-to-retirement pathways, would reduce the risk of changed income 
needs in old age. 
A range of other social benefits, including greater individual choice and well-being, also seem 
likely – if harder to quantify. However, as with any large social change, distributional 
consequences are inevitable. A few groups could be relatively worse off in a world where the 
norm was for work to be extended later in life. In the absence of strategy for addressing the 
needs of these potential losers, there may well be reluctance to take policy action, despite the 
likelihood of large gains for most, and on many fronts.  
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le  passé  persistent.  Cependant,  ces  tendances  ne  reflètent  pas  encore  totalement  les 
pressions futures qui contribueront fortement au recourssissement du temps passé à la 
retraite plus et à l'allongement de la durée du travail.  
Ces  nouvelles  pressions,  provenant  du  départ  en  grand  nombre  des  baby‐boomers  du 
marché du travail, vont affecter les conditions de l'offre et de la demande de travaille à la 
f a v e u r  d ’ u n e  h a u s s e  d e  l a  d e m a n d e  d e  t r a v a i l l e u r s  â g é s .  D u  c ô t é   de  l'offre,  nous 







effets  négatifs  bien  connus  liés  au  vieillissement  de  la  populat i o n .  O n  o b s e r v e r a i t  d e s  
conséquences importantes sur la politique des pensions, avec une réduction significative 





du  bien‐être,  semblent  également  envisageables  –  même  si  difficilement  quantifiables. 
C e p e n d a n t ,  c o m m e  p o u r  n ' i m p o r t e  quelle  grande  restructuration  sociale,  des  impacts 
redistributifs  sont  également  à  prévoir.  Certains  groupes  pourraient  se  retrouver 
relativement moins bien lotis dans un monde où l’allongement de la vie active deviendrait 
l a  n o r m e .  E n  l ' a b s e n c e  d ’ u n e  s t r a t é g i e  p o u r  r é p o n d r e  a u x  b e s o i n s  d e  c e s  p e r d a n t s  
p o t e n t i e l s ,  i l  p o u r r a i t  b i e n  y  a v o i r  u n e  r é t i c e n c e  à  l a  m i s e  e n   place  de  ces  nouvelles 
































This paper had its origins in the observation that current discussions about 
pension reform in Canada are based on research that assumes, almost 
certainly incorrectly, that retirement ages are stable and will be subject to 
only small changes in the coming years. These assumptions are made 
despite the volatility of past retirement patterns, despite a widely-expected 
upward trend in the labour market demand for older workers and despite 
the fact that the extension of work to later periods of life would have 
large, direct implications for pension policy. 
If the goal of the policy debate in question were to compare the possible 
effects of different types of incremental reforms to a particular pension 
program, then it would make sense to assume no large exogenous changes 
in retirement behaviours. However, if the goal were an examination of 
what might actually happen in the future, and how that future might be 
shaped by policies introduced today, then it would be important to 
examine how retirement behaviours are likely to change in the future as 
the result of demographic, market and societal forces.  
Such an examination typically does not take place, either here or in other 
developed countries. Instead the assumption, often implicit, of stable work 
and retirement patterns gets built into the underlying research that 
informs the policy debate. For example, the assumption is often built into 
the macro- and micro-modelling economic modelling that is used in 
analysis. 
Current pension discussions in Canada illustrate this point. These 
discussions centre on the adequacy, security and efficiency of the 
retirement income system. An important underlying concern is that many 
people are not adequately saving for retirement and that new pension 
instruments may therefore be required. However, the factor that will 
likely make the most difference in determining whether retirement 
savings are adequate (i.e., the number of years spent in work and 
contributing to a pension versus the number of years retired and receiving 
a pension) has not reached the policy table.  4 
 
While it is the pension example that gave rise to this paper, the paper takes 
a broader view and examines a range of policy issues that would be 
touched by later transitions to retirement. 
… the argument is not that good research does not exist  
It is important to underline that the contention of this paper is not that 
retirement ages and retirement durations have been entirely ignored by 
Canadian researchers. Indeed, there have been many important 
contributions to the topic, including work by researchers associated with 
the SEDAP network
2 , the C. D Howe Institute





Rather, the argument is that significant extensions of working life are 
largely ignored in the research that most directly supports the big policy 
discussions of the day – particularly as they relate to pensions, but also to 
the social, economic and fiscal consequences of aging more generally.  
For example, in the case of pensions, the Canadian policy community 
received the message from the research community that retirement savings 
may be inadequate for a considerable number of people, given a 
continuation of existing retirement patterns. They did NOT receive the 
message that it is highly unlikely that retirement ages and durations will 
remain unchanged – a message that completely changes the policy 
implications of the research. 
The reasons for this failure in the policy-research dynamic are not 
discussed in the present paper, but will be explored in a parallel paper 
(Hicks, forthcoming). Some of the problem may simply reflect 
unsuccessful attempts in the 90s to change ages of pension eligibility or 
concerns about distributional consequences. However, the parallel paper 
                                                             
2 SEDAP (Program for Research on Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population) papers 
include recent work by Denton and Spencer (2010) and Hering and Klassen (2010) 
3 Including Banerjee and Robson (2009), Dodge Laurin and Busby (2010) and Moore, Robson and Laurin 
(2010)  
4 Especially (PRI 2004) and (PRI 2005) 5 
 
will argue that there are deeper issues at play, some of them arising from 
the way in which policy research is commissioned and funded in Canada.  
1.2 Structure of the paper 
Section 2 looks backward at recent trends in work and retirement patterns 
– reporting on, but largely dismissing, the relevance of data on average 
retirement ages and on people’s reported retirement intentions as guides to 
the future. The emphasis instead is on actual employment rates. 
Section 3 looks ahead, taking account of new demand and supply 
pressures that are likely to result in a significant increase in the duration of 
work and shortening of the duration of retirement. 
Section 4 demonstrates the surprisingly large positive consequences of 
such a shift on a range of topics of interest to policy-makers. 
Section 5 concludes by noting that policy reforms may be impeded by our 






This section describes existing evidence about recent trends in retirement 
durations. 
•  Section 2.1 introduces the topic with a discussion of individual and 
population aging. 
•  Section 2.2 shows that recent history has seen major changes in 
average retirement ages – the usual, but flawed, marker between 
work and retirement. 
•  Section 2.3 rejects the temptation to use data about retirement 
intentions as a guide to average retirement ages in the future, but 
argues that the data is useful for future distributional analysis. 
•  Section 2.4 turns to a more reliable indicator, namely employment 
rates by age, and finds large changes likely lie ahead. 
2.1 The key issue: duration of life spent in work and in 
retirement 
Two demographically-related trends are at play in discussions of work and 
retirement.  
•  First, people are living longer and living longer in good health. If 
average retirement ages remain unchanged, this means that a greater 
percentage of time during an individual’s healthy lifespan is spent in 
retirement, relative to the amount of time spent in work.  
•  Second, falling fertility has resulted in populations with more older 
people and, in the case of Canada and many other countries, has 
resulted in baby boom phenomena with large numbers of people of 
working age in recent decades, but with the baby boomers reaching 
traditional retirement ages in large numbers starting about now. If 
average retirement ages remain unchanged, this will lead to much larger 
numbers of retirees relative to workers. 7 
 
The second, population aging, effect has larger economic effects and has 
dominated policy research for decades, as briefly described in Figure 1. 
The traditional analysis has relied heavily on demographic factors alone, 
usually some version of an ‘old-age dependency ratio’ that compares the 
size of the  
Figure 1. The evolution of the population aging story 
In the 1980s and most of the 1990s, the standard 
narrative about the policy effects of demography 
centred on baby boomers and old-age dependency 
ratios (i.e., the ratio of the population aged 20-64 to 
the population aged 65 and over).  
The message was that the baby boomers were of 
working age. A relatively large number of employees 
produce a relatively large amount of goods and 
services that are consumed by themselves and by a 
relatively small dependent population, mainly youth 
and retirees. Starting about 2011, the baby boomers 
will be entering retirement age and the dependency 
ratios will start to grow, posing difficult economic and 
fiscal challenges.  
In the early 90s, these narratives were mainly cast in 
terms of huge crises ahead – with titles like ‘averting 
the old age crisis’, and relying on images such as 
tsunamis.  
Policy solutions were passive – coping with the 
inevitable demography, mainly by fiscal means or by 
relying on exogenous (and undefined) productivity 
improvements.  
By the late 1990s, the rhetoric had toned down. It 
was more about ‘managing’ a large demographic 
transition or, in the words of the OECD (1998), 
‘Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society’. 
Increasingly as we have got nearer to the critical date 
of 2011, the emphasis shifted away from 
demographic factors taken in isolation and towards 
analysis that also took account of the actual time 
people spend in the labour force, regardless of age. 
This was a crucial shift: 
•  In reality people were retiring earlier than 65, and 
retirement patterns had been changing quickly 
(with retirement ages dropping sharply during the 
decades preceding the mid-1990s and then starting 
to rise more recently). 
•  As well, while policy can do little about population 
aging directly; policy can potentially influence the 
time that people spend in work. That is, the 
broader perspective opened up the possibility of 
policy shifting to a work active stance – especially 
dealing with the removal of policy-induced 
incentives to early retirement.  
What has remained largely missing from these policy 
narratives, even in their most sophisticated form, is an 
empirically-based assessment of the likely magnitude of 
future changes in the duration of retirement. Generally 
it has been assumed that one-time adjustments of 
perhaps a year or two extra years of work might be 
possible, a shift that would not have a large or 
continuing effect on labour supply or on dependency 
ratios. Even the PRI (2004 and 2005) analyses, which 
reflected current life-course thinking in its descriptive 
analysis, limited its main empirical modelling to a 
scenario that involved one-time extensions of working 
life of only two years. 
As noted in Section 1, in the last year or two some 
researchers have started examining larger changes in 
the durations of work and retirement, changes that 
could have large social and economic effects. This 
paper joins these efforts in attempting to bring these 
effects to the attention of the policy world.  
 
working age population with the size of the retirement age population – 
making the often implicit assumption that that ages at which people 
actually retire will remain largely unchanged.  8 
 
The contention of this paper is that this neglect of the actual ages at which 
people make the transition for work to retirement is quite unrealistic. The 
paper also pays more attention to individual ageing than is customary.  
This section examines past trends in the borderlines between working life 
and retirement. 
2.2 Past trends in average retirement ages  
The average age of retirement has been the traditional marker for 
measuring the boundary between work and retirement – a marker which 
we will quickly review, but which we will suggest has limited value. 
Figure 2 shows the Statistics Canada data on average retirement ages. For 
women, the average age fell by 5 years from about age 65 in the mid-1970s 
to about age 60 in the mid-90s. For men, the drop was a little less, from a 
little over age 65 in 1976 to between 61 and 62 years in the mid-90s.  
That is, average retirement ages dropped by some 3 to 5 years during a 20 
year period in which the labour force was growing as a result of the baby 
boom generation being of working age. The last decade has seen more 
stability, with a slight increase in average retirement ages. The 1990s 
marked a reversal of trends towards declining retirement ages in most 




































Figure 2. Average age of retirement (Statistics Canada calculations), men 





Figure 3 shows the average retirement age for both sexes, including 
averages for the public and private sectors and for self-employed people. It 
strongly re-enforces the conclusion that retirement ages are not stable over 
time. 
•  In 1976, the average retirement age for all three groups was about 
65. 
•  In the public sector, average retirement ages plummeted to less than 
58 years by the mid-90s, a drop of 7 years – and have been rising 
since then.  
•  The private sector average retirement age also fell during this 
period, but less sharply. 
•  There has been less movement in retirement ages among the self-
employed, possibly in part because they were less touched by 
pension changes during this period. Census data show that the self-
employed (particularly those with higher-level educational 
attainment and family income) make up a significant portion of 









































The OECD has a different method
5 of calculating international retirement 
ages that uses 5 calendar year groupings. Comparing the mid-90s (1993 -
1998) with the most recent period for which data is available (2002 to 
2007), we see that many countries have seen significant change in this 
short nine year period. In some countries such as Canada, this happened 
during the period before the real upward pressures on retirement ages 
began as a result of the retirement of the baby boomers. (In some 
countries, the baby boomers reached retirement ages earlier – but, in 
nearly all countries, the OECD data show a shift towards later 
retirement). 
                                                             
5 Because of the way countries keep their statistics, the OECD must use 5 calendar year averages, 
meaning that their numbers are unfortunately always out of date. The OECD data can be found at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,en_2649_34747_39371887_1_1_1_1,00.html. The Canadian 
data is current, but more subjective, since the Labour Force Survey asks people why they are not 
employed, with ‘being retired’ as one optional response.  11 
 
•  Canada’s average retirement age increased by 1.3 years in this nine 
year period to 62.1, using the OECD methodology. 
•  Australia’s average retirement age jumped 2.6 years (to age 64.4). 
•  In Germany, there was an increase of 1.3 years (to age 62.1). 
•  In the Netherlands, the growth was smaller, 0.6 years (to age 61.6). 
•  In New Zealand, there was a huge growth of 3.2 years (to age 66.5).  
•  In Sweden, the increase was 1.6 years (to age 65.7).  
•  In the United Kingdom, the increase was 1.5 years (to age 63.2). 
•  In the United States, there was a small decline in this 9 year period 
of 0.2 years (64.6). 
In other words, current average retirement ages in Canada are in the 
middle of the pack when compared to countries that are roughly similar 
to us, as are recent trends towards increasing levels of those ages.  
Conclusions are hard to draw from average retirement age data 
It is hard to draw firm conclusions from these overall average retirement 
age figures: 
•  Especially for women where trends also reflect their growing 
participation in the labour force during this period.  
•  As well, changes in average retirement ages are hard to interpret 
since they reflect the combined effect of two different phenomena: 
population aging and changes in employment rates. That is, 
retirement ages are calculated based on the number of people at 
each age (affected by demographic changes) who withdraw from 
the labour market (affected by changes in labour market 
behaviour). For most analytic purposes, it is better to separate out 
the effects of demography and labour market behaviour. This is 
done for illustrative purposes in Figure 7 in the next section. 
•  In addition, the very concept of average ‘retirement’ is ambiguous. 
The word ‘retirement’ has many meanings. Does it refer to leaving 
ones full-time ‘career’ job? Or withdrawing entirely and 
permanently from the labour force? Or does it refer to receipt of a 
pension or other form of retirement income? A recent study 12 
 
(Denton and Spencer 2008) clearly shows that the concept of an 
average retirement age may have little practical meaning as a way of 
marking the divide between the worlds of work and retirement. 
This is particularly worrisome in Canada where the official data 
reflect self-reported perceptions about whether the person is 
‘retired’ – without reference to any standard definition of 
retirement
6. 
•  Further, an ‘average’ retirement age has little meaning given the 
heterogeneity of the pathways from work to non-work in later life. 
Micro data that trace individuals over time have shown much 
heterogeneity in the paths that people follow in moving from 
participation in the labour force in the middle portions of their 
lives to full withdrawal often quite late in life (PRI 2005). In light of 
this wonderful complexity of the real world, the data on ‘average’ 
retirement ages begins to look quite abstract and unhelpful.  
Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is that changes in average 
retirement ages have been quite large and that they vary across sectors and 
countries, reflecting differences in employment rates and demographic 
profiles.  
There is nothing much that policy can do about the demography, but 
policy can affect employment rates. For example, it is hard to imagine that 
the large drop and subsequent recovery retirement ages in the Canadian 
public sector was unconnected to public policy – including the effects of 
pension changes and industrial relations within the public sector as well as 
early retirement incentives in the early to mid-90s. The OECD (2011) 
shows how policy changes in different countries, especially those related 
to age of pension eligibility, can have large effects of people’s retirement 
ages. 
However, these effects are easier to see by looking at employment 










Another way of examining people’s work and retirement behaviour is to 
study people’s reported retirement intentions. There is reasonably rich 
data here, as Statistics Canada surveys have examined the topic from 
various perspectives and the results have been carefully analyzed 
particularly by Schellenberg and Ostrovsky (2008). However, here too the 
use of average ages of retirement is problematic given the ambiguities in 
the meaning of retirement, and given the often long and complex 
pathways from full time work to full time retirement. The use of data on 
past intentions is particularly problematic for forecasting ahead, as is 
discussed below.  
The data shows a recent gradual increase in the ages at which people 
expect to retire. Schellenberg and Ostrovsky (2008) compare data for 1991, 
2002 and 2007 for three age groups: 45-49, 50-54 and 55-59. Among the 
youngest of these age groups (which contains many baby-boomers) there 
was a significant rise in the age of expected retirement ages over this 
period. For example, in 1991 only 20% those aged 45 to 49 thought they 
would retire at age 65 or older. By 2007, this has risen to over 27%. There 
was much less change in expectations among the older age groups. 
Views on reforms to increase retirement ages 
Data on people’s intentions and opinions also support the view that 
people would accept well-designed reforms that favoured later retirement. 
Hering and Klassen (2010) review the Canadian literature and 
international experience on public reactions to reforms that increased the 
age of pension eligibility. They conclude that the public would react 
positively to gradually introduced, small changes in the context of public 
debate that examined the alternatives. This conclusion is in line with 
virtually all the research on the subject over the past decade. We return 
this theme in Section 3.3. 
Caution is needed in using these data to look ahead… 
Given that the year 2011 is a major demographic turning point, it would 
be prudent to assume that data based on past intentions and opinions are 
of limited use as indicators of future retirement behaviour, at least on 14 
 
average. That is, people’s past decisions on when to retire, and on their 
retirement pathways, were influenced by the supply and demand 
considerations of the day – by a set of push and pull factors that will no 
longer apply in the future. Yesterday’s demography reduced the demand 
for older workers; tomorrow’s demography will increase incentives to 
stay longer in the labour market. 
That said, the intentions data do clearly point in the direction of later 
retirement among the baby boomers over the next decade or so, although 
extent of this is not easily quantified. In analysing cross-sectional data such 
as this, it is difficult to sort out the effects of different expectations held by 
boomers, overall changes in public expectations about retirement during 
this period, and the nearness to actual retirement (and, hence, more 
realistic understanding of retirement needs and existing retirement 
preparations). However, the change could be quite large
7. Certainly 
nothing in these data would contradict the view that an increase in 
retirement ages of five years is the minimum that might be expected over 
the coming 10 or 15 years. 
…but they still provide important distributional information  
While past data on retirement expectations may offer little guidance about 
average age of future retirement, they are most useful in distributional 
analysis. That is, they are almost certain to have something important to 
say about the way in which future retirement patterns are likely to vary 
across people with different characteristics, including immigration status, 
health status, education, class of work, industry and occupation, home 
ownership, employment history, the roles of two-earner families and 
other variables that may be important in distributional analysis.  
2.4 Employment (or non‐employment) rates give a better picture 
of what may lie ahead 
What people actually did in the labour market, their employment rates 





analysis, when compared with ambiguous concepts such as retirement – 
whether actual ages of retirement or retirement expectations.  
Denton and Spencer (2008) point out that the core meaning of retirement 
is negative; it refers to older people who do not work in the labour market 
and who therefore need some form of income support other than 
earnings. Figure 4 puts an emphasis on the negative nature of the concept 
by displaying the inverse of the usual data on employment rates; it looks 
at men and women in different age groups who were not employed in 
2009 – including time spent in school, care-giving, unemployment, 
sickness and retirement.  
…it is better to simply look at employment rates, or ‘non‐
employment rates 
Figure 4 shows, not surprisingly, that the ‘non-employment rate’ is U-
shaped over life. However, some readers may find it a little surprising to 
see the extended period of life in which work decreases and ‘retirement’ 
grows.  
•  Many younger people are in school, not in the labour force.  
•  Work is concentrated in the middle of life and withdrawal from 
work starts at about the age of 50 and gradually grows in 
successively older age groups.  
•  The same basic U-shape exists for both sexes, with work attachment 
being somewhat stronger among males in older age groups and 
among women in younger age groups. The data for women mainly 
reflect the growth of the number of women who have participated 


















Figure 4. Percent of the total population age 15 and over that is NOT 




Figure 5 shows trends in these non-employment rates for older age groups, 























































































Figure 5. Changes over time in the percent of the population that did 







Trends were flat during the period from 1976 to the mid-1990s in most 
older age groups, but with some upward trend towards ‘retirement’ for 
those aged 60-64.  
However since the mid-1990s, there has been a clear decline in the 
proportion of the ‘retired’ population in all of these age groups – although 
with a blip up in the most recent period among in the 55-59 group, 
reflecting the recent economic downturn. There has been relatively little 




What do these trends suggest for the future? Figure 6 shows the same data 
for the main age groups of interest, but reverts to the more customary 
way of presenting them as employment rates. This chart starts in the mid-
1990s when the growth in employment rates began and extends a simple 





































































































•  For the age group 55-59, there is an increase of 20 percentage points 
from 67% in 2009 to 87% in 2031. 
•  The increase is equally large for people age 60-65, moving up from 
47% to 27%. 
•  The increase for people 60-69 is smaller than that for the other 
groups, but still quite dramatic: 11 percentage point increase from 
21% to 32%. 
It might be felt that the magnitude of the upward trend in the figure has 
been exaggerated because the time series begins only in 1993 and shows a 
linear trend that only takes account of a period when employment rates 
have been growing. However, we also ran trend lines from 1976 on, using 
a polynomial trend line that can capture changes in the direction of 
trends. These showed an even more extreme growth in employment rates 
in most older age groups, even exceeding 100% in 2031 in some cases – an 
impossible result that points to the risks of using mechanical projections 
over such long time periods. 
In the next section, we will use a more moderate, conservative approach 
to looking at future employment patterns by age, one that takes better 
account of cohort effects. However, this simple graph is a reminder that 
we should not rule out the possibility of surprisingly large changes in the 
coming years. 
Enriching the analysis using cohort and longitudinal analysis 
The analysis to this point has used traditional point-in-time averages from 
the past to examine what might lie ahead. This has the great advantage of 
simplicity and ease of explanation, but it could well be misleading if used 
in isolation. In looking to the future, what is really needed is analysis 
based on longitudinal data and on an understanding of changing patterns 
among cohorts of people. Section 3.2 gives an example of what can go 
wrong if we rely only on cross-sectional data. 
Fortunately, in the case being examined here, other research does exist 
that uses data that tracks the same individuals (or the same cohort of 
individuals) over time. Those studies provide a more nuanced picture but 
with the same basic conclusions. 19 
 
For example, Denton, Finnie and Spencer (2009) use cohort analysis based 
on both employment data and income data to show that changes in 
retirement patterns are more gradual than shown by the cross-sectional 
data used here and in most studies. However their analysis confirms that 
early retirement was growing until the mid-90s and has been decreasing 
since then. Their study also shows that, from a cohort perspective, the 
retirement patterns of men and women look more similar than is seen in 
the cross-sectional data. It also finds that while there is still a peak in 
retirement at age 65, it has become less pronounced in later cohorts. 
Denton, Feaver and Spencer (2009) use cohort analysis to show that life 
expectancies are significantly longer than appear when using traditional 
cross-sectional data – almost 4 years longer for males age 50 in 2006. They 
conclude that ‘continued reductions in mortality, and consequent gains in 
life expectancy, will result in people living longer than is suggested by 




This section has attempted to be cautious about drawing conclusions 
about future durations of work and retirement based on past trends. Our 
conceptions of what constituted ‘normal’ participation in school, work 
and family changed radically as the baby boomers participated in those 
institutions. Completion of secondary school and participation in post-
secondary education became the norm, not the exception. The nature of 
work evolved extremely rapidly with the spread of the knowledge 
economy. Two-earner families became the norm; gender equality 
improved in the education system (greatly), in the work force and, to a 
lesser extent, in household work. Health improved with the prospect of 
further gains in life expectancy. 
In other words, the aging of the baby boom generation was associated 
with profound changes in our economic and social structures. In looking 
ahead to the period when the baby boomers enter their older years, it 
would seem likely that there will be equally large changes in the nature of 
retirement, a concept that has already become ambiguous in its meaning.  20 
 
It is wise to be cautious in predicting the future at big societal turning 
points such as this. We simply do not know what the future will hold. 
However, caution in this case certainly does not mean assuming there will 
be no change ahead in retirement behaviour or that past trends will 
continue. No change is the least probable outcome in these circumstances. 
What is needed is an examination of a range of quite different scenarios for 




The future duration of work and retirement will be mainly determined by 
the effects on older workers of future trends in labour demand and supply. 
The demand side factors are complex and can be only be reasonably 
quantified in the context of scenario-building as set out in Section 3.1. 
The supply-side factors – the number of potential workers in older age 
groups and their skills – are relatively easy to assess. They are discussed in 
Section 3.2.  
These market forces could be supplemented by policy changes as briefly 
described in Section 3.3. 
3.1 The demand for labour: scenarios for an uncertain future  
Section 2 ended by observing that, in looking to the future in areas such as 
labour demand, we need to construct a range of scenarios about what the 
future might hold, and not rely on simplistic projections. In building 
scenarios, we should anticipate changes in future retirement patterns could 
be large, paralleling radical past changes associated with the boomers in 
the areas of school, work and family. Scenarios are especially important in 
looking to the future demand for labour, which can be affected by many 
forces. 
Developing such scenarios is certainly feasible, but difficult and resource-
consuming, including the use of recent technologies such as micro-
simulation analysis. It would involve looking at a wide range of factors, 
including: 
•  Business cycles and the overall health of the labour market.  
•  Changing patterns of work, learning and leisure at all stages of life 
(e.g., the timing of the transition from school to work and mid-
career learning, changing patterns of gender and family roles in 
care-giving). 
•  Possible policy changes, including society’s response to the 
potentially very large effects on health and long-term care when the 22 
 
baby boomers reach their 80s and 90s a couple of decades from 
now. 
Scenario-building on these lines is far beyond the scope of the present 
paper. Rather, this paper has the modest goal of showing why, regardless 
of the scenario, we should assume that there will be significant change in 
the durations of work and retirement, as opposed to the status-quo 
assumptions that are embedded in much existing research used for policy 
purposes. 
The analysis of past trends in Section 2 suggests that about five years of 
increased lifetime work might be considered as a reasonable minimum 
that could apply in most future scenarios. (We will explain how we arrive 
at this ‘about five years’ figure shortly.) It is important to note that a five 
year extension of work does not automatically lead to a five year 
shortening of the duration of retirement since life expectancy is also likely 
to continue to increase over the coming decades (Denton and Spencer 
2010). 
In order to illustrate the effects an extension of working life of this 
magnitude, we developed a simple estimate that assumes that, by 2031, 
people in older age groups (over age 55) have the same employment rates 
as did those in the preceding 5 year age grouping in 2009: 
•  For example, it assumes that the percentage of people in the age 
group 55 to 54 in 2031 was the same as in the age group 50-54 in 
2009. 
•  An exception is made for people over 70, where it is arbitrarily 
assumed that only 10% will be employed in 2031. This is roughly 
equivalent to an increase in the employment rates for people in 
their early 70s so that they reach the 20% level now experienced by 
those 65-69, but with little change in the current rates, about 5%, 
for those age 75 and over. 
Although we are not using statistics on average retirement ages in our 
analysis for reasons discussed in the last section, these averages are useful 
in illustrating the magnitude of the effects of the assumed changes in 
employment rates. These are seen in Figure 7. 23 
 
Figure 7 shows that average retirement ages will increase both as a 
consequence of changing demography and changing employment rates. If 
both are taken into account, there could be an increase of about 6 years in 
average retirement ages between 2009 and 2031, about 4 of them being the 
result of the higher employment rates. It these 6 year and 4 year additions 
that are the basis for our use of the phrase of delaying retirement by about 
5 years. 
We will use the recalculated employment rate figures in the analysis of 
policy implications in the next section. Here we simply note that they 
should be treated as a cautious, minimum estimate: 
•  It is a lesser increase than that implied by the mechanical projections 
in Figure 6, in the last section. 
 
 
Figure 7. How increased employment rates for older workers would translate 
into average retirement ages 
In a simplified
1 model where everyone makes 
an abrupt transition from work to retirement: 
•  The average retirement age in 2009 would 
be 62.9 years, assuming existing 
employment rates. If we continue to use 
these 2009 employment rates, by 2031 the 
average age of retirement would be 64.9, 
up by 2 years as a consequence of the 
aging of the population between now and 
2031. 
•  If we applied the higher employment rates 
for older people (i.e., those that we have 
assumed for 2031) to the data for 2009, 
the average age of retirement in 2009 
would have increased from the actual  
figure of 62.9 to 65.7 – an increase of 2.8 
years accounted for by these higher 
employment rates. 
•  Assuming the higher employment rates, 
the average age of retirement in 2031 
would be 69.1 – up by 6.2 years from 
2009, as a consequence of the changes in 
both the age structure and the higher 
employment rates.  
•  Looking only at 2031, the average 
retirement age would be 69.1 assuming 
the higher employment rates – and 64.9 
with existing employment rates for older 
workers, a difference of 4.2 years 
 
1 These rough estimates were calculated by single years of age using Statistics Canada’s M2 
population projections. Employment rates by single year were simply imputed from the five year 
Statistics Canada averages from the Labour Force Survey, assuming a steady pattern of labour 
force withdrawal from year to year (i.e., no clustering around specific ages such as 65), and 
assuming no retirement prior to age 55 and no employment after the age of 75. 
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•  The trends and mechanical projections of Figure 6 relate to the 
labour market situation that existed when the baby boomers were 
still of working age and female employment was growing. The 
demographically-induced labour shortages will only begin to be felt 
in the coming years, where they will replaced to demographically-
induced labour surpluses. That is, we should anticipate strong new 
demand-side pressures towards longer retention of older workers in 
the labour market. 
•  Those past trends do not yet fully include the complementary 
supply-side effects of the increased education levels and experience 
that the older baby boomers will bring to the labour market, as 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
•  These labour market pressures are likely to be re-enforced by 
financial market trends that are likely to see the returns to capital 
fall relative to wage growth
8.  
•  The international literature (e.g., OECD 1998 and 2006) has made it 
clear that later retirement would be the only large source of new 
labour supply that could respond to the demographically- induced 
labour shortages. Other sources, such as reduced unemployment or 
increased immigration might play a supporting, but small role. 
•  Policy changes, particularly in pensions, could reinforce later 
retirement, as discussed in Section 3.3. 
However, we cannot quantify the effects of these pressures in the absence 
of the scenario work. So all we can safely conclude is that labour demand 
for older workers will increase and that, in most reasonable scenarios, 












Happily, forecasting on the labour supply side is easier. The numbers of 
potentially available older people is a simple demographic calculation. 
Section 4 provides some illustrative numbers. As well, estimating the 
future skills and individual productivity of those older people is equally 
straightforward, at least to the extent that we can rely on educational 
attainment as a rough proxy for skills, and hence productivity and 
earnings. We already know a lot about tomorrow’s older workers; they 
are simply today’s middle age workers, but with more experience.  
Future retirees – baby-boomers and subsequent generations – are much 
better educated than the generations that preceded the boomers. The 2006 
census tells us that among people aged 45 to 54, some 84% had some form 
of degree or certificate (including secondary graduation) and that only 
16% did not. Among those 65 to 74 (pre-boomers) there were twice as 
many people without any certificate (32%) and only 68% with a 
certificate. Among those age 45 to 54, some 25% had a university degree 
or certificate, compared with only 16% for those age 65 to 74. 
This gain in education levels will, of course, result in a comparable gain in 
the future educational levels of older people as a result of the simple aging 
of cohorts. In 2026, for example, the educational attainment of those 65 to 
74 years will be about the same as it was for those 45 to 54 at the time of 
the 2006 census.  
Is educational attainment and experience a good proxy for skills and 
productivity? 
Educational attainment is an imperfect proxy for skills and hence for 
individual productivity, earnings and increased demand for labour. 
However, it is one of the few measures that do exist and, in the absence of 
other evidence, we must assume a large increase in the potential human 
capital of older people in the coming decades. This is particularly so for 
people between the ages of 65 and 74; issues related to mental and physical 
capacity may exist in ages older than that. 
It is important to underline the importance of cohort analysis when 
looking to the future. Quite different, and quite misleading, results are 
obtained if one looks only at current cross-sections such as age-earnings 26 
 
profiles. Here one sees that earnings flatten off and even decline among 
older workers. However, these effects are not due to age but to larger 
numbers of lower-skilled people among older workers and to differences 
in working hours. For example, the 2006 census allows us to make better 
cross-sectional comparisons. Looking only at people at the same education 
level (university degree or certificate in this example), and looking only at 
people who worked full-time, full-year, we see that average employment 
earnings in 2005 rose with age, and quite dramatically. For people in this 
category who were:  
•  Age 15 to 24, average employment earnings were $30,000. 
•  Age 25 to 44, average employment earnings were $65,000. 
•  Age 44 to 64, average employment earnings were $74,000. 
•  Age 65 and over, average employment earnings were $88,000. 
Data such as these can be misleading as well unless carefully interpreted. 
For example, it may be that a disproportionate number of high earners 
work later in life. Nevertheless, the data that does exist tends to support 
the common sense notion
9 that skills, productivity and earnings increase 























The evidence suggests that, in coming decades, the potential supply of 
skilled older workers is large enough to meet any reasonable labour 
demand scenario. Over the long term, employers are likely to adjust the 
conditions of work to make them even more attractive to recruitment and 
attention of older workers. 
That is, supply side considerations are likely to reinforce the demand side 
pressures towards later retirement that were discussed earlier. 
3.3 Policy initiatives could re‐enforce market pressures  
This paper does not attempt to describe the many policy changes that 
have already been introduced that encourage later retirement, and 
discourage early retirement. The purpose of the section is simply to 
remind readers that policies directed to these ends are a main theme of 
government policy agendas around the developed world and may well 
spill over to Canada, re-enforcing the market pressures to working later. 
For this purpose, it is simplest to look at the international literature, 
particularly OECD reports which have carefully studied many aspects of 
the issue. The OECD findings mirror many Canadian studies and, indeed, 
Canadian research has played a large role in the OECD findings about the 
situation here. 
In its pivotal Maintaining Prosperity in an Aging Society (OECD 1998), the 
OECD proposed a multi-stranded strategy for dealing with the policy 
implications of aging populations. Emphasis was placed on the importance 
of later retirement, on the need for balance among the sources of the 
retirement income, on cost effectiveness reforms in the area of health and 
especially long-term care, on the labour market situation of older workers, 
and on pension and financial market reform.  
An integral part of its proposal was that national strategies should include 
a framework for coordinating the implementation of the various reforms, 
for overseeing the development of needed data and analytic tools and for 
building public understanding and support.  
In the years since then, the OECD has monitored progress and enriched 
its analysis in most of the areas of proposed reform, although often on 
separate tracks. In particular, health and long-term care reforms are 28 
 
usually treated as part of a different policy agenda from those relating to 
older workers and pensions.  
A detailed study of retirement income in nine countries (OECD 2001) 
found that Canada had the least problems of the nine in ensuring 
pensioner’s well-being and protecting vulnerable groups, but was only 
average in balancing time spent in work and retirement. Public pensions 
are modest in size compared with other countries. However, pension 
spending would grow faster than other countries in the absence of changes 
in retirement behaviour – reflecting the rate of population aging in 
Canada.  
OECD reports during the past decade have continued to argue that 
Canada’s retirement income system, and its policies and practices directed 
to older workers, compare favourably with other OECD countries. In 
other words, the OECD reports do not suggest that, when compared with 
other countries, there is a big problem in Canada that needs to be fixed; 
rather Canada is blessed with big opportunities that can be even further 
exploited. 
For example, in its large comparative study of employment policies that 
could support longer time spent in work (OECD 2006), it was noted that 
Canada was comparatively well placed to meet the challenges of 
population aging and that there had been improvements in the situation of 
older workers.  
•  It was argued that more should be done to improve the employment 
opportunities of older workers where participation rates are below 
those in several other OECD countries. 
•  There were recommendations directed to increase flexibility for 
combining pensions with work income, using surveys to better 
understand the extent of age discrimination in the labour force, and 
strengthening employment service for older workers. 
•  However, the recommendations were quite minor when compared 
with those suggested for many other countries. They would have 
modest effects only in increasing the employment of older people. 
Similarly, an OECD specialist examined Canada’s pension system in 
conjunction with the current federal-provincial-territorial pension review 
(Mintz 2009) and found, once again, that our pension system compared 29 
 
favourably with those in other countries on most criteria. While labour 
force participation of older workers is slightly lower than average, this 
was not the result of features of the public pension system. 
Would any policy changes make a big difference? 
What kind of policy change could make a big difference in changing 
retirement behaviour in a country such as Canada where the system is 
fundamentally sound and where work disincentives for older workers are 
comparatively small? A recent, major OECD report on the subject 
provides a simple answer. The 2011 edition of Pensions at a Glance 
(OECD 2011) devotes much attention to measures that would have the 
effect of bringing retirement ages in line with increased life expectancy.  
•  One approach being used in about half the OECD countries is to 
use various means to tie pension benefits to life expectancy. These 
means include greater use of defined contribution schemes in both 
public and private pensions as well as direct links between benefit 
levels and life expectancy. The basic logic is that if people live 
longer, they will receive less benefit unless they work longer. The 
OECD sees drawbacks with this kind of approach to incenting 
later retirement, particularly for low-income workers 
•  Linking pension eligibility more closely to life expectancy is a better 
route, the OECD argues. Half of OECD countries are already 
increasing statutory pension ages or will do so in the coming 
decades. However, in all but five countries, projected gains in life 
expectancy over the next four decades will outstrip prospective 
increases in pension ages. 
In the introduction to the report, the OECD authors express surprise that 
so few countries have taken the approach of simply linking age of 
eligibility to life expectancy. (The authors would presumably be especially 
surprized that age of pension eligibility is not even on current policy 
agendas in Canada). It is not a complete solution as the report notes, but it 
is one that the evidence shows will work in practice. It helps resolve the 
‘pension paradoxes’ found in many other approaches. It would provide a 
clear signal of the need to work longer. As well, as described in Section 
2.3, it would be likely meet little public resistance, as recent experience in 
the United States has demonstrated. 30 
 
In Canada, age of eligibility reforms would likely involve gradually raising 
the age band at which one could receive C/QPP, perhaps starting by 
shifting it from to 61 to 71, with small additional increases in subsequent 
years. Denton and Spencer (2010) provide practical examples of how this 
could be done and examine the consequences of different phase-in 
scenarios. 
Conclusion 
The argument of this sub-section is not that Canada will, or should, raise 
the age of pension eligibility. Market forces, by themselves, will result in 
later retirements. However, the OECD evidence suggests that reforms 
along these lines would provide important additional incentives for 
working longer. Over the course of the next two decades, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Canada may well adopt a policy reform that is 
being adopted in so many other countries and that appears to make such 





Spreading work in a flexible manner over a longer period of people’s lives, 
with later retirement on average, could have far-reaching effects. 
•  Section 4.1 shows that later retirement would significantly reduce 
the negative economic, fiscal and labour market consequences of 
population aging. 
•  Section 4.2 shows effects on pension policies, including a reduced 
need for retirement savings and better tools for managing income 
risks in older ages.  
•  Section 4.3 describes possible effects on health and individual well-
being. 
In looking at these consequences, it is important to disentangle the effects 
of: 
•  The rise in effective retirement ages. 
•  The extent to which this rise results in additional life-time years 
spent in work. 
•  The extent to which this rise results in additional life-time years 
spent in non-work activities at other stages of life, including during 
the transition to retirement.  
In this section, unless otherwise stated, we assume that effective 
retirement ages and life-time years spent in work will both increase by at 
least five years between now and 2031. As indicated in Section 3, five 
years is a conservative assumption, one that does not take account of the 
new supply and demand pressures that seem likely to result in even 
larger increases. 
Near the end of Section 4.2 and in Section 4.3, we also explore the 
consequences of further reallocations of leisure now spent in retirement 
to some combination of learning, care-giving and leisure at other stages 
of life. However, this discussion is speculative, with no quantification of 
the extent to which this is possible or likely. The further work on 
scenario-building that was referred to in Section 3 should take these non-





As noted earlier in Figure 2, policy narratives about the effects of 
population aging have evolved over the years and now take account of the 
combined effects of population aging and changing patterns of work. A 
comprehensive measure of this is an hours-based ‘producer-consumer’ 
ratio: the time actually spent at work producing the goods, services and 
income needed to support the activities of life outside of work. 
Figure 8 shows such a producer-consumer ratio. It provides a time series 
showing the total numbers of hours that are actually worked in an average 
week by the whole population aged 15 and over, taken as a percent of the 
total amount of time that is not worked during that week.  
Figure 8 shows that: 
•  Between 1976 and 2009, the ratio was at a high level because most of 
the large baby boom generation was of working age. The late baby-
boomers were still entering the labour market during the earlier 
part of this period and one might have expected to see greater 
growth in the ratio then. In reality, the ratio moved up and down 
considerably during this period, mainly in line with the business 
cycle, but showed no significant underlying trend.  
•  The positive demographic effects were partially offset by trends 
among males towards early retirement (until the mid-1990s) and by 
longer longevity. In other words, the economic gains that resulted 
from the favourable demography and productivity gains of those 
years were used, in part, to fund ever-longer periods of leisure in 
retirement. 
•  The baseline projection shows a large deterioration in the producer-
consumer ratio in the period between now and 2031. It reflects the 
effect of the retirement of the baby boomers, using the same 
assumption that is implicit in much of today’s policy discussions, 
namely that retirement ages remain unchanged.  
•  This baseline projection suggests that, unless other things happen, 
there will be a significant decline in time spent producing goods, 33 
 
services and income – with the resulting negative fiscal and 
economic consequences that are well documented in the Canadian 



















Figure 8. Producer-consumer ratio, with projections to 2031
(Actual hours worked in the economy as percentage of the hours that were spent 
outside of work)
Baseline producer-consumer ratio Working later scenario
 
Note on the construction of Figure 8 
The chart shows the actual hours worked by all people age 15 and over as a percent of their hours not 
spent at work. This shows the combined effects of population aging and changing retirement patterns on 
the economy by comparing: 
o  The time spent producing goods, services and income  
o  The time spent using those goods, services and income outside work (e.g., in leisure, learning, care-
giving, personal time such eating and sleeping, holidays, vacations, unemployment or sickness.) 
The data from 1976 to 2009 are from the Labour Force Survey.  
The baseline projection uses Statistics Canada's medium population projections and assumes that the 2031 
employment-to-population ratio and hours worked data remain unchanged from 2009. 
The ‘working later’ projection uses same population and hours data, but assumes that, by 2031 people in 
older age groups have the same employment rates as did those in the preceding 5 year age grouping in 
2009.  
o  See Section 2.1 for a more detailed discussion of the employment rate methodology and how the 
resulting data can be translated in terms of average retirement ages. 
o  Average weekly hours in the different age groups have not changed greatly during the period from 
1976 to 2009 and are therefore assumed to remain unchanged into the future, although this may be a 
conservative assumption with respect to cohort trends among older women. 34 
 
 
•  The ‘later retirement scenario’ which approximates an increase in 
retirement ages of five years over this 20 period, greatly reduces this 
drop, although does not eliminate it entirely.  
In other words, a significant extension of work over a longer period of life 
would also greatly ease collective economic and fiscal problems associated 
with population aging
10. For reasons outlined in Section 3.1, increases in 
the duration time spent in work are likely to rise by more than those used 
in calculating Figure 8. It is easy to envisage scenarios where the negative 
economic effects of population aging would be completely offset.  
In Canada, Denton and Spencer (2010) use much more refined 
techniques
11 than those in Figure 8 to explore the consequence of different 
approaches and different implementation strategies for moving to higher 
normal retirement ages. Several of their scenarios result in a 5 year 
increase in retirement durations by 2035. The results for these are similar 
to those in Figure 8: 
•  They use still another version of the familiar old age dependency 
ratio: a ‘support’ ratio that compares the size of the population that 
is normally entitled to public pensions (age 65 and over) to the total 
population. That ratio doubled from 7.7% in 1966 when the CPP 
was introduced to 14.1% today. If ages for pension eligibility 
remain unchanged, this figure would jump to 24% by 2035 – the 
result of population aging and increased longevity. However, if the 
normal retirement age were to increase by five years over the next 
25 years, the support ratio would only reach 18.3% – significantly 
reducing the negative economic impact of demographic changes. 
•  If retirement ages remain unchanged, by 2035 men would spend 









indeed, up from 23% in 1966 and 28.5% today. However if 
retirement ages were to increase by 5 years, only some 24% of adult 
life would be spent in retirement – lower than today but still a little 
higher than in 1966. Women spend more of life in retirement, but 
the pattern over time is similar. 
•  Similar results are found on the fiscal side. If labour force 
participation rates were to grow in line with higher ages of pension 
eligibility, and if the age of eligibility were to reach age 70 by 2030, 
the Denton and Spencer numbers show that the contribution rate 
to sustain the public pension system would increase somewhat, 
from 6.4% in 2010 to 7.3% in 2030. By comparison, with no change 
of eligibility, the contribution rate would be 11.6% that year, a 
large jump.  
Labour market effects 
As to labour market consequences, the later retirement scenario would see 
the number of employees in 2031 being some ten percent higher than in 
the baseline scenario. And, particularly as a consequence of more flexible 
work-retirement transitions, labour markets would likely be more 
efficient and could more easily adjust to economic cycles – although we 





We begin by asking why we have publicly-supported pensions in the first 
place and why we have designed them so that the period in which 
pensions are received grows with increasing longevity.  
Life expectancy has been increasing sharply in recent decades, with most 
of the additional years spent good health. Since 1966 when the CPP and 
QPP were introduced, life expectancy has grown by about ten years for 
men and eight years for women. Life expectancy at age 65 has grown by 
more than 5 years in the same period for both sexes. The trends towards 
longer, healthier lives are likely to continue in the decades to come) and, 
in the absence of change, most of this additional period of life will be 36 
 
spent in retirement. (Denton and Spencer 2010 and Hering and Klassen 
2010). 
Figure 9 suggests that, if we were to look only at the underlying rationale 
for retirement, there would seem to be no problem, at least in principle, 
with a reduction in the duration of retirement of 5, 10 or more years over 
the coming decades. Retirements would still be longer than those that 
were originally envisaged. 
If longer retirements are not a policy goal, why have we continued to 
support pension policies such as the OAS and CPP/QPP that have fixed 
ages of entitlement (or an actuarially adjusted band around a fixed age) and 
hence have encouraged longer periods of retirement? 
 
 
Figure 9. Why does public pension policy support healthy, increasingly skilled people 
in not working during a growing period at the end of their life? 
From the perspective of historical hindsight, we 
can deduce that there were several reasons for 
the introduction of public policy to support a 
period of non-work starting at a fixed age near 
the end of average lives. 
•  Much work was too physically demanding to 
be handled by older workers, particularly 
during the period in later life when health 
often begins to deteriorate – typically in the 
several years before death.  
•  A sense that workers should be rewarded by a 
period of leisure after a long, hard lifetime of 
contributing in the labour market, together 
with the declining role of families as the 
primary support for retirees.  
•  In the labour market, private pensions were 
often seen as deferred wages that became 
entrenched in compensation systems, with 
retirement (including mandatory retirement) 
being seen as a needed device to ensure that 
older workers do not become overpaid 
relative to their declining productivity.  
Nothing in these rationales would support retirement 
durations of some 25 or 30 years that we can see on 
the horizon in the absence of changes in retirement 
ages. And no new rationale along these lines has 
emerged. Quite the opposite is true.  
As discussed in Section 3.2, a smaller percentage of 
people are engaged in hard physical work and, in 
most jobs in the knowledge economy, the 
productivity of people in their 60s and even 70s is 
higher than it is for young, and less experienced, 
workers. And, as discussed earlier (see footnote 9), 
Kesselman (2004) has clearly shown why the 
argument that some older workers may be overpaid 
relative to their productivity is not an important 
consideration for policy. 
Social discussions today, at least at the level of 
rhetoric, put a premium on greater individual choice 
in making lifecourse choices – greater work-life 
balance, spreading learning more evenly into mid-
careers and later in life. There would seem to be little 
room in this line of thinking for policies that provide 
strong incentives for concentrating leisure at a 
particular period of life. 
 
Several factors account for the continuation and entrenchment of policies 
that support increasing amounts of leisure being concentrated in the past 37 
 
third of life. Economic growth and productivity gains in recent decades 
have produced large payoffs that have manifested themselves in terms of 
increased time being freed up for leisure and learning – away from work: 
•  Since the 60s there has been a large increase in time spent in 
learning, particularly at the post-secondary level. 
•  There has been a less dramatic, but still significant reduction in the 
time that employees spend at work. According to labour force 
survey data, average weekly hours actually worked fell by 2 hours 
between 1976 and 2009, from 38 hours to 36 hours. 
•  However, much the largest gain in leisure has been among retirees, 
where gains in leisure are measured in years not hours. 
In other words, past economic prosperity has been translated into gains in 
leisure/learning throughout the whole life-course and, aside from 
continuing concerns about work-life balance and lifelong learning, there 
has been no strong societal incentive to question the way in which the 
newly available non-work time was allocated across the stages in the life-
course. In the labour market, the loss of labour supply that resulted from 
early retirement was more than compensated for by new sources of 
supply: the baby boomers were of working age and more women were 
joining the labour market.  
To the extent that this analysis is correct, then we should anticipate quite 
rapid changes in the coming years as pension and older worker policies 
catch up with the move of the baby-boomers into retirement. In past 
decades, policies directed towards encouraging later retirement were 
working in the opposite direction to market forces. In the coming decades 
they will be working in complementary directions.  
Reducing the need for retirement savings  
The obvious pension payoff from shorter retirement durations would be a 
reduced need for retirement savings. Figure 10 illustrates the dramatic 
consequences on individual retirement savings that could result.  
In order to simplify things, Figure 10 looks at a full-career worker in some 
hypothetical country that has no pension schemes per se (neither public 
nor private), but that relies entirely on individual savings during working 
life, with the resulting annuity providing the needed retirement income. It 38 
 
shows what would happen if that individual were to retire at age 55, 60, 65 
and 70.  
•  While the example is far removed the real world, comparisons 
across the scenarios can give a reasonably good sense of the 
magnitude of the effects of retiring at different ages that would 
occur over the longer run:  
•  In all scenarios, the annual pension benefit is identical and adequate 
to maintain living standards. 
•  The person who retired at age 55 would need to save 37% of their 
annual earnings to finance his or her retirement.  
•  If he or she retires at age 60, the needed savings drop to 25% of 
average annual earnings. Retiring at age 65 reduces this amount to 
16%, while retiring at age 70 means that only 10% of annual 




Figure 10. Scenarios showing individual-level effects of different retirement ages 
on retirement income contributions and benefits, using highly simplified 
assumptions 
Individual retires at age 55 
Contributes $22,380 annually for 30 years  
(Total contribution of $671,400) 
Receives annual pension of $42,000 for 30 years  
(Total benefit of $1,302,000 – coming from 
direct savings plus returns on those savings) 
Individual retires at age 60 
Contributes $15,036 annually for 35 years  
(Total contribution of $526,260) 
Receives annual pension of $42,000 for 25 years  
(Total benefit of $1,050,000 – coming from 
direct savings plus returns on those savings) 
 
Individual retires at age 65 
Contributes $9,552 annually for 40 years  
(Total contribution of $382,080) 
Receives annual pension of $42,000 for 20 years  
(Total benefit of $840,000 – coming from 
direct savings plus returns on those savings) 
Individual retires at age 70 
Contributes $6,144 annually for 45 years  
(Total contribution of $276,480) 
Receives annual pension of $42,000 for 15 years  
(Total benefit of $630,000 – coming from 
direct savings plus returns on those savings) 39 
 
Simplifying assumptions 
The individual was born in 1985, starts work in 2010 and will have a life expectancy of 85 years. 
Salary throughout working life is $60,000 annually and retirement income during each year of retirement 
is 70% of that ($42,000). The 70% figure is often used to calculate the income needed to avoid a drop 
in material living standards in retirement, although it has weaknesses that will be referred to later. 
All retirement income comes from an annuity that was built up with equal contributions made in each 
year of working life. 
Annual yields are 3% during the contribution period and 1% after retirement. Inflation is 0%. 
 
In other words, later retirement requires significantly reduced savings in 
order to ensure adequate income throughout retirement. These effects are 
large, at least in the long-run. The answer to the question about whether 
people are saving enough for their retirement therefore depends hugely on 
assumptions made about retirement ages and durations of retirement.  
Table 1 tests the sensitivity
12 of the Figure 10 findings by making three 
changes: 
•  It adds CPP and OAS to the calculations. At one the level, this adds 
realism. At another level, however, it is less realistic in that the 
existing rules of the CPP and OAS are necessarily followed in 
making the calculations. It is much more likely that, in those 
scenarios where people retire at much later ages, the ages of 
eligibility for these programs would rise in the long run.  
•  It uses a more sophisticated approach to determining what income is 
needed in retirement. Figure 10 used the traditional 70% of pre-
retirement earnings (which is typically assumed to be enough to 
ensure that consumption levels do not fall after retirement). Table 1 
uses a more direct measure of consumption replacement levels 
(based on pre-retirement income less taxes and savings). People 








75% of pre-retirement consumption is used. (The table also shows 
the comparable earnings replacement figure
13.)  
•  It uses Canadian average earnings of $47,200, rather than the 
$60,000 in Figure 10. 
As in Figure 10, Table 1 considers four full-time career workers in 
Canada, each of whom earns the average wage (in 2010) and relies on both 
private and public savings during their working lives, and both an annuity 
and public pension benefits in retirement. It shows what would happen if 
those individuals were to retire at different ages (55, 60, 65 and 70) in 
terms of how well the retirement income system is helping them avoid a 
significant drop in their material standards of living in retirement.  
•  An individual who retires at age 55 must save almost 21% of his or 
her earnings per year. This drops, by a factor of four, to 5.5% for 
the individual who retires only 15 years later at age 70. (If CPP 
contributions are included with private savings, the total savings 
rate falls from 25% to 10 %.) 
•  A separate calculation (not shown) was made for people who earn 
1.5 times the average wage ($70,800). While private savings rates 
rise slightly (by between 1.4 and 2.5 percentage points) in this case, 
the same pattern exists of a greatly reduced need for savings for 
individuals who retire later. 
Table 1. Scenarios showing individual-level effects of different retirement 
ages on consumption replacement  
  Individual 
retires at age 
55 
Individual 
retires at age 
60 
Individual 
retires at age 
65 
Individual 
retires at age 
70 
Work  30 years  35 years  40 years  45 years 
Annual earnings ($)  47,200  47,200  47,200  47,200 
Private savings ($)  9,865  6,891  4,248  2,596 
CPP contributions ($)  2,163  2,163  2,163  2,163 







Retirement  30 years  25 years  20 years  15 years 
Annual pension ($)  18,731  19,487  18,282  17,881 
CPP pension ($)  3,536  4,243  6,061  7,879 
OAS benefits ($)  4,173  5,008  6,259  6,259 
Annual income ($)  26,439  28,737  30,603  32,020 
Replacement rates (%)         
Consumption  75 75  75  75 
Annual earnings  56  61  65  68 
Private savings rate (%)  20.9  14.6  9.0  5.5 
Simplifying assumptions 
•  Each individual was born in 1985, starts work in 2010 and will have a life expectancy of 85 years. 
•  Taxes are ignored in this analysis. 
•  Retirement income comes from an annuity that was built up with equal contributions made in each year 
of working life, from CPP pensions to which the persons contributed (at the 2010 rate) each year of 
their working lives, and from OAS benefits financed from general tax revenues. Average July 2010 
benefits levels are used for CPP and OAS. 
•  Annual yields are 3% during the contribution period and 1% after retirement. Inflation is 0%. 
 
Sensitivity analysis was undertaken (not shown here) that examined the 
reasons for the gap in private savings between the ages 55 and age 70. It 
found, not surprisingly that by far the largest contributors were years 
retired and, especially, years worked (together accounting for 65% of the 
gap). Only 6% was due to interest rate assumptions, with remainder due 
to differences in public pension benefits from retiring at different ages. 
…Dodge, Laurin and Busby on private savings rates 
Dodge, Laurin and Busby (2010) make much richer calculations related to 
the need for private retirement savings, with results in the same order of 
magnitude. They use still more sophisticated analysis and sensitivity 
testing – including analysis by income decile. Calculations are made 
assuming 50%, 60% and 70% replacement rates. Savings rates vary with 
age. They compare scenarios where individuals retire at ages 63, 65 and 67, 
with retirement savings starting at age 30 in all cases (to take account of 
the volatility of earnings and savings in the early working years, including 
earnings interruptions).  
•  Their analysis shows that the need for private retirement savings 
decreases sharply given a five year delay in retirement. For 42 
 
example, take people in the 6
th income decile and assume a 70% 
replacement rate. In this case, the constant private savings rate 
would be 17% of annual pre-tax earnings if they were to retire age 
63. If they were to retire at 67 that savings rate would be only 10%.  
•  Note that these figures are in addition to public pension savings 
such as the CPP and QPP. In the case of people in the 6
th income 
decile who retire at age 65, the private savings rate would be 13% 
while the C/QPP savings would be 6%, for a total of 19%. 
Managing the risks of changing income needs during the course of 
later life  
Shorter retirement durations not only reduce the need for retirement 
savings, they also reduce income-related risks that may occur during the 
course of old age. Retirement planning involves much risk including:  
•  The much-studied risks associated with the market value of 
retirement investments at the time of retirement, the vulnerability 
of company pensions to bankruptcy and sharp economic 
downturns, and other risks associated with the savings and pensions 
instruments themselves. 
•  Uncertainties about one’s future income needs – how long one will 
live after retirement and how much income will be required during 
those retirement years.  
In some cases, the risks of longevity are pooled through defined-benefit 
pension and annuity schemes but, in all cases, there is much uncertainty 
about what level of income will actually be needed during the course of 
retirement – often many years in the future. Adequate retirement income 
as determined by a fixed percent of pre-retirement income, or pre-
retirement consumption, may make sense on average. However, 
circumstances and needs can vary greatly across individuals and can 
change during the course of retirement – in ways that are not predictable.  
Income risks in later life are best managed in a system with flexible 
retirement pathways and multiple sources of income during a person’s 
older years. These sources include not only the standard pension pillars 
but also other savings and assets, earnings from own employment, home 43 
 
ownership, the earnings of other family members, access to services such 
as health care and long-term care, tax breaks, etc.  
Retirement ages are central to risk management at the level of individuals. 
In the case of abrupt transitions from work to complete retirement, the 
illustration in Figure 10 shows that:  
•  If the individual retired at age 55, he would be out of contact with 
the labour force for an extremely long period of 30 years, more 
than a third of an average (and growing) life-span. Most of those 30 
years would be spent in good health and with good labour-market 
skills – at least at the outset of retirement. However, these skills 
would quickly fade away through lack of use.  
•  If the individual retired at age 70, his sources of income would be 
much more balanced in these last 30 years of life, with earnings still 
playing the key role in the first half of that period and, in the 
second half, there would be less time away from the labour market 
for skills to fade. 
Risks are even better managed in cases where there is a flexible transition 
to retirement extending over a number of years – allowing greater choice 
in the balance between earnings and retirement income sources. Working 
longer on a part-time, or part-year basis has the additional advantage of 
maintaining skills and job contacts, facilitating greater participation in the 
labour market at a subsequent time – should there be a need or desire to 
do that. 
While extending work to a later stage of life will reduce income risks on 
average, it may well create distributional issues. Some people will not be 
able to work longer. The consequences are discussed in Section 5. 
4.3 Life course flexibility and spin‐off effects on health and well‐
being  
There would be many potentially positive effects both to individuals and 
society if pension or other reforms could create incentives such that work 
would be spread more flexibly over a longer period of life, with more time 




In the absence of changes in retirement ages, a large and growing portion 
of life will be spent in leisure in retirement. We have argued that could 
amount to perhaps 25 years on average by the year 2030. Greater life-
course flexibility refers to a situation where there is greater choice in how 
people allocated time over the course of life to work, leisure, learning, 
family life such as raising children and care-giving generally. This includes 
the possibility of taking some of the 25 years of concentrated leisure that 
(in the absence of change) would be spent in retirement and allocating it to 
activities at other stages of life: 
•  This paper has argued that it would be reasonable to assume that at 
least 5 of those 25 years would likely be reallocated to work (some 
of which might be part-time but which, in total, would amount to 
the equivalent of five years of full-time work). This would take 
place mainly when people are in their 60s and early 70s. 
•  It seems likely that many people would choose to retain a long 
period of retirement. However some may choose a duration that is 
more in keeping with earlier conceptions of retirement – a period 
of perhaps 5 to 10 years or more of leisure spent in good health 
before the onset of health problems that are usually concentrated in 
the years before death. Others may choose to blend work and 
leisure over an even longer period in later life, for example by 
working part-time or part-year during the transition to retirement.  
•  That still leaves many years that could be potentially re-allocated, 
for example to more leisure at earlier stages of life (e.g., longer 
vacations or occasional sabbaticals), to longer periods of initial 
education, mid-career training and education, or to time-off for 
raising children or caring for frail parents.  
While there is good evidence to suggest that the reallocation towards work 
will be reasonably large, there is little evidence that would help us estimate 
the magnitude of the reallocations referred to in the second and third 
bullets above. About all that can be said is that reallocations will likely 
vary greatly from individual to individual, in part depending on the extent 
to which the life-course choices are real or constrained.  45 
 
Effects of working longer on well‐being 
Greater life-course choice, of course, would by itself represent a major step 
forward in social progress. As well, the balance of evidence suggests that 
maintaining a longer attachment to employment, one of the main 
institutions that provide structure in our society, could result in a net 
improvement in health and individual life satisfaction However, a lot 
depends on whether people like their jobs:  
•  Statistics Canada’s General Social Survey of 2005 found that people 
got more satisfaction from paid work activities than they did from 
most leisure and cultural activities (as reported in Wolfson 2010) – 
making nonsense of much economic analysis on this subject
14. 
Indeed, for people over the age of 65, paid work was at top of the 
list of activities that people said they enjoyed the most. 
•  On the other hand, stress, which in some cases can arise from work, 
is negatively related to health and well-being. Many of those with 
stressful jobs will have retired before the age of 65. 
Spreading work in a more flexible fashion over a longer period of life 
should, therefore, result in major gains in health and well-being – at least 
on average.  
•  For those who like their job, that satisfaction is spread over a longer 
period of life.  
•  Spreading work over a longer period of life opens up opportunities 
for a greater spreading of learning, leisure and care-giving over life – 
reducing work-life stresses and time-crunches at earlier stages of life, 
and increasing human capital. (PRI 2004)  
•  For those who are without adequate retirement savings, working 
longer provides greater opportunities to manage uncertainty and 








se does not appear to be a major driver of perceived well-being, at 
least among older workers. (Statistics Canada 2010) 
•  Among some of those who dislike their jobs, the longer time-frame 
and greater life-course flexibility (including a longer period in 
which to recoup the returns to investments in mid-career training) 
will provide more opportunities to change jobs in mid-career.  
•  However, some workers may not be in a position to exercise this 
flexibility and, in a world where the norm shifts to working longer, 
their well-being may decline. As noted, the next section returns to 
these difficult distributional issues.  
These social benefits are potentially important, but difficult to quantify. 
At minimum, one can be confident that shorter retirement durations and 
flexible retirement pathways will have a net positive effect on both 





For decades, population aging has dominated policy agendas, often using 
images of tsunamis and cataclysms. This paper has suggested the changing 
labour market forces could well offset some or all of the negative 
consequences of population aging. Figure 12 speculates about the effects of 
this on policy agendas. 
A more positive policy metaphor may therefore be needed. One might be 
found in a comparison between human resources and natural resources.  
The paper has argued that Canada and other developed countries are 
sitting on a rich pool of largely untapped human resources that, if 
exploited in sensible manner, will bring large benefits on many fronts. 
Like many natural resources that have been built up over the years, they 
can be tapped only once – but the benefits will nevertheless last for many 
years.  
The resource in question is the wave of older people of the baby boom 
generation who have the health and skills to make a large and major 
contribution to the labour market, particularly when they are in their 
mid- to late 60s. Demand and supply pressures that, in the past, worked 
towards earlier retirement will reverse starting about now and will create 
incentives towards working longer in life and towards more flexible 
pathways to retirement.  
Figure 9. Population aging as a way of framing policy agendas 
For decades, population ageing has been used as 
device for framing policy agendas, especially at 
the international level. The core issue has been 
the multi-dimensional, and largely negative, fiscal 
and economic consequence of the retirement of 
the baby boomers.  
However, the analysis here suggests that, in the 
coming period, when the baby boomers actually 
start retiring, population aging may disappear 
from the centre stage of big macro policy 
agendas. That is likely a good thing on balance, 
since there is little that policy can do to change 
population aging.  
Demographic analysis will, of course, remain of 
central importance in policy analysis, but be used in 
conjunction with other kinds of analysis, such as 
changes in labour market behaviour. 
Moreover there are specific policy areas where 
population aging will remain in the forefront. This is 
particularly in the area of health and long-term care 
policies. In a couple of decades, baby boomers will 
reach advanced old age, when frailty and health 
problems become common. It would be wise to tap 
their labour market resources now in order to help 
prepare for the greatly increased costs of health and 




That is, most of benefits from the exploitation of this valuable new 
resource will occur as a result of market and society forces alone. 
However, the evidence is clear that they can be re-enforced by policy 
action as discussed in Section 3.3. Policy action may however be difficult 
without a better understanding of the distributional consequences of later 
retirement.  
5.2 A case for better knowledge of distributional effects 
While tapping the time and skills of older people for use in the labour 
market is a potential success story on a surprisingly large number of 
fronts, we are not suggesting that the news is entirely positive.  
As already noted, demographically-induced health and long-term care 
challenges will continue to grow. More generally, while most people will 
gain in a society where, on average, work takes up a longer period of life, a 
minority of people may lose. 
A commonly used example is the case of those vulnerable workers with 
stressful or otherwise unpleasant jobs, whose health suffers and whose life 
expectancy is short. A combination of dying early and working longer 
may rob them of a decent period of retirement – a much needed time of 
recuperation and leisure at the end of their lives. There seems to be deep 
unfairness here because they contributed to pensions that they cannot 
fully use.  
Less dramatic, but still real are older workers who simply do not have the 
skills or health to work later in life. Social well-being is, at the end of day, 
measured in a relative manner. Low-income lines are determined in 
relation to the income of our neighbours. In a world where, on average, 
people work longer, the well-being of those who cannot work longer may 
fall relatively. In some cases, this may result in higher off-loading pressures 
– people moving off pensions and onto social assistance or disability 
pensions. Even today, many countries find that their disability or 
unemployment programs become a substitute, and costly, form of 
transition from work to retirement. 
Until we have some solutions to distributional issues such as these, or 
even better knowledge of the likely extent of these problems, there may 49 
 
be reduced appetite for policy changes that involve extending retirement 
ages. 
It is important not to exaggerate the distributional consequences:  
•  As noted earlier, the size of the groups that might be negatively 
affected by later retirement is becoming smaller over time. Hard 
manual work is shrinking as portion of the workforce and healthy 
life expectancy is growing. 
•  The most vulnerable are not those who work longer now. It is 
people in better health, with higher educational attainment and 
with higher incomes that now choose to work longer (Denton and 
Spencer 2008, p 19). There no reason to expect this to change in the 
future. 
•  As well, in a world where most people are retired for fewer years, 
there would be large fiscal savings from reduced pension costs. 
These could be used for many purposes, but among them could be 
programs directed to other approaches to compensate for any losses 
that might result from higher retirement ages – if the evidence 
suggests that these are needed. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence of the magnitude of the 
distributional effects, they have potential to de-rail reforms that would 
have high pays-offs for most. This line of argument suggests that there 
would be much benefit from greater research on the distributional 
consequences of a changing balance in time spent in work and retirement 
over the course of life – and of the changing nature of the pathways that 
connect the two. It is an area where current knowledge is weak and, 
where compared with many other countries, our analytic tools (such as 
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